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Excerpts from the Comments on PSB D-21 Prepared by the
Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany

The handicaps obstructing the achievement of our purposes (Section V, Part A, Para. 1b) is considered too generalized and may be usefully expanded to include these factors:

1. Defeatism resulting from lack of faith in the strength of the West as compared with the Soviet Union; lack of faith in the fighting qualities of other Western European nations -- the French and Italians; belief in the probability of Soviet occupation in event of war;
2. The precarious character of popular sympathies for the West and the United States resulting from still widespread resentments developing as an aftermath of war and occupation; doubts in the consistency of US policies and respect and fear for the monolithic character of Soviet power;
3. A German tendency to exploit her own position, within or outside of the Western Alliance; Germany's tendency to adopt a bargaining policy which might place too high a price for her support or even endanger German reliability;
4. German irredentism, particularly among the millions of evacuees and refugees, and other nationalistic trends which may force us into embarrassing positions or result in independent actions by Germany;
5. Belief that US aid and protection of Germany can be taken for granted regardless of German actions and contributions;
6. Tension resulting from the continuous presence of Allied forces in Germany, long identified with occupation, and their unavoidable intrusion into the lives of many smaller communities and their continuing need for facilities;
7. Widespread belief that integration with the West will perpetuate the division of the country;

Action which may become necessary to counteract these dangers and tendencies can be fitted into Section V, Part C. However, PSB may want to consider the advisability of clarifying such recommendations for action, as for instance to:

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- a) Maintain awareness of Germany's need for the cooperation of Western nations in the interest of German security and economic well-being;
- b) Create understanding for the fact that US policies in Europe are predicated on joint European efforts and realization that the US has chosen this policy as the best and most beneficial of several alternatives, while Germany and other European countries have hardly any choice if they want to preserve their freedom;
- c) Create understanding that the cooperation of other Western European nations is indispensable for the defense of Europe and the concerns of all these nations must be considered;
- d) Exploit actions and attitudes of Soviet and Soviet-Zone authorities to demonstrate the intent of Soviet policy under existing power relations to prevent the zone under their domination from joining in a free and united Germany, and create confidence that the key to German unity lies in the necessity for changing present power relationships;
- e) Use US and German national celebrations and other suitable occasions to demonstrate in words and deeds the role of Allied troops stationed in Germany in the joint alliance for the preservation of peace and the protection of Germany.

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It does not seem that sufficient attention has been given to the logical coherence and consistency of the set of policies, objectives and tasks outlined. For example, the objective of maintaining our position economically and politically in Berlin, and of avoiding our nullifying Soviet pressures on us here, may well be endangered by the set of various policies and actions proposed for handling the East Zone and East Berlin. To take another specific example, the policy of winning over German business men to the GATT notions of freer trade is likely to be endangered by efforts to pressure the German (even indirectly) into stricter control of East-West trade; and the proposal for all kinds of pressure (even though subtle and indirect) in matters of economic policy will undoubtedly conflict with the objective of facilitating the shift of Germany from the status of an occupied country to that of a free and equal partnership. The Germans are no more stupid than any other people, and will promptly recognized pressure of any kind for what it is.

On p. 22 under Part C 5(c) one task is outlined as being to "stimulate organs of public opinion to expose and demand action against illegal trade transactions."

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On the basis of experience encountered by the "Free Jurists" on this subject, Eastern Affairs Division would like to draw attention to some of the problems involved in such an undertaking. The Free Jurists have engaged themselves recently in exactly this process of exposing illegal East-West trade. In doing so they have engendered severe opposition from business interest and the latter's representatives in official positions such as Mr. Vockel, the Federal Government's representative to Berlin, and elements within the Kaiser Ministry. These sources have reportedly exercised various forms of pressure upon the Free Jurists to cease their efforts to expose and criticize illegal interzonal trade.

Eastern Affairs Division does not intend to imply that this is a reason to drop the action recommended by PSB D-21, but simply to warn of some of the complications and necessity for adequate support and defense of such German public opinion forming organs which do have the courage to pursue such a course of action.

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Page 24 - "harassment and controlled preparations for more active resistance ..."

However justified and necessary these objectives may be, these paragraphs raise most serious questions of aim and method in our psychological strategy which it is most dangerous to keep hanging without an answer. They would appear to allow -- and even, to a Berlin reader, to imply -- methods of operation whose eventual violence lays them open to many of the same objections which are the West's most justified complaint against Communism. Again, this is no abstract question. Members of a West Berlin resistance organization are currently being tried for trying to "impede the flow of strategic materials" by means of dynamite, for organizing resistance, in terms of active sabotage; perhaps these charges are untrue, but the leaders of this organization have not laid them entirely at rest. Western-oriented people in both East and West are beginning to feel that the West, after all, may be willing to sacrifice human beings in the East for its ends -- sacrifice them when it cannot protect them, sacrifice them without hope of immediate change of conditions which might justify them. Increasing doubts on this point -- the blurring of the West's issue of justice and humanity -- raises most serious issues for our psychological strategy which are by no means fully explained or solved in this paper.

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It is surprising on page 9 to encounter the following reference to the Oder-Neisse question: "Through non-attributable propaganda media exploit the Oder-Neisse line issue as evidence of basic Soviet anti-German attitudes and imperialist claims." I believe it has been previously our policy to avoid references to the Oder-Neisse line in view of the fact that we were a party for provisional recognition of it and even party to forcible population shifts which resulted from it. The Oder-Neisse line also involves not only our policy toward the Germans, but our policy toward the Poles who are notoriously suspicious of any propaganda which might be taken to mean that Germany might be revived at their eventual territorial expense.

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Finally, it must be observed that this paper takes little continuous cognizance of the important opportunity presented by the presence of several hundred thousand artificially-segregated Russian soldiers in the Soviet Zone. Far more could be done to make this group a more vital target of present US efforts. If, as this paper suggests, "all available procedures" should be used to "induce the disaffection or defection of officers and men of East German satellite and Soviet military or paramilitary forces," it can only be rejoined that this condition is far from being achieved and that Public Affairs could render considerable help through overt media toward achieving it.

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
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1. SPP		6 Oct. 1952			File: PSB Plan for Germany
2. RI					for number.
3. SPP 1018 K		UCI			File: PSB Psychological Strategy for Germany.
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